arXiv:2606.23671v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Prior work shows that large language models (LLMs) exhibit introspective capability on benign tasks. We extend the question to safety contexts and examine how reliably a model can recognize that its own prior response was elicited by an adversarial prefill attack. Across ten open-weight instruction-tuned LLMs (3B to 70B) and four safety benchmarks, no model reliably recognizes its own compromised outputs, with models claiming intent on prefilled responses at an average rate of $27.3\%$. Introspective signal stems largely from safety- and refu

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