Talk is (Not) Cheap: A Taxonomy and Benchmark Coverage Audit for LLM Attacks

arXiv:2605.15118v2 Announce Type: replace-cross Abstract: We introduce a reusable framework for auditing whether LLM attack benchmarks collectively cover the threat surface: a 4$\times$6 Target $\times$ Technique matrix grounded in STRIDE, constructed from a 507-leaf taxonomy -- 401 data-populated and 106 threat-model-derived leaves -- of inference-time attacks extracted from 932 arXiv security studies (2023--2026). The matrix enables benchmark-external validation -- auditing collective coverage rather than individual benchmark consistency. Applying it to six public benchmarks reveals that the

Source: arXiv cs.CL — read the full report at the original publisher.

This is a curated wire item. The Continuum Brief does not republish full third-party articles; this entry links to the original source.