arXiv:2606.27951v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: AI agents are promising tools that can act as flexible behavioral nudges to enhance human cooperation in addressing large-scale societal problems. However, evidence on whether AI agents can effectively boost cooperation remains mixed. We recruited 1,283 participants to play iterated Collective Risk Games in small groups, testing whether AI assistants could nudge participants toward cooperation. By using persuasive framing personalized to each player's Social Value Orientation profile, the AI interventions significantly increased contributions a
This research provides new evidence on the efficacy of AI in influencing human cooperation, directly addressing current debates around AI's societal impact and its potential for behavioral nudging.
Understandings of AI's persuasive capabilities are critical for policy, ethics, and strategic applications, as it demonstrates AI's potential to shape collective human behavior on a large scale.
The perception of AI roles expands beyond automation to active, personalized framing designed to influence human interaction and decision-making in collective action scenarios.
- · AI ethics researchers
- · Social scientists
- · Government agencies (for public policy)
- · AI development platforms
- · Platforms susceptible to AI-driven manipulation
- · Individuals vulnerable to persuasive AI
- · Organizations relying solely on traditional nudges
AI agents are validated as effective tools for increasing human cooperation through personalized persuasive framing.
This capability could be scaled to address complex societal problems, but also raises concerns about potential misuse for manipulation or undue influence.
The development of 'AI for good' initiatives will accelerate, alongside demand for robust regulatory frameworks concerning AI's behavioral influence on populations.
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Read at arXiv cs.CL