arXiv:2606.28824v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: This paper develops a continuum theory of exit-and-join coalition dynamics in nonatomic cooperative games. We extend the Aumann-Shapley value and the Aumann-Dr\`eze value to coalition structures in which each coalition is treated as a restricted nonatomic game, yielding a marginal-contribution-based payoff density that governs incentives for agents to remain in, exit, or join coalitions. We derive deterministic mean-field dynamics from decentralized switching rules and show that payoff-difference switching recovers replicator dynamics as a spec
This paper represents a theoretical advancement in understanding complex multi-agent systems, particularly relevant given the increasing interest in AI agents and their emergent behaviors.
A strategic reader should care because theoretical frameworks for cooperative games and coalition dynamics are foundational for designing robust and adaptive multi-agent AI systems, including those that operate autonomously.
This research provides a mathematical model for how agents form, leave, and join coalitions, extending established game theory concepts like the Aumann-Shapley value to dynamic, nonatomic cooperative settings.
- · AI researchers
- · Game theorists
- · Developers of multi-agent systems
- · Static game theory models
Improved theoretical understanding of coordination and competition in large-scale decentralized systems.
Potential for new algorithms and frameworks for managing complex autonomous AI agent ecosystems.
Enhanced design of economies and governance structures for future AI-driven operational environments.
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Read at arXiv cs.AI