arXiv:2606.19683v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This paper studies coalition formation as a decentralized dynamical process driven by unilateral exit-and-join decisions. Agents evaluate local moves using the Aumann-Dreze value, so payoffs are computed within the agent's current coalition rather than through a globally negotiated coalition structure. The resulting model links cooperative payoff allocation with noncooperative best-response behavior: a terminal partition is precisely a coalition structure with no admissible, individually profitable exit-and-join deviation. We establish equilibriu
The paper investigates new decentralized approaches to coalition formation, reflecting a growing need for robust and adaptable multi-agent systems.
This research provides a theoretical foundation for more sophisticated and autonomous AI agents capable of forming and dissolving coalitions dynamically.
The focus on unilateral 'exit-and-join' decisions using local evaluations, rather than global negotiations, changes how complex AI systems can coordinate effectively.
- · AI agents developers
- · Decentralized autonomous organizations
- · Logistics and supply chain optimization
- · Centralized control systems
- · Simple rule-based multi-agent systems
Improved stability and efficiency in multi-agent systems operating in dynamic environments.
Reduced need for central orchestration in complex AI deployments, enabling greater system autonomy.
Emergence of more resilient and self-organizing AI ecosystems across various applications.
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Read at arXiv cs.AI