arXiv:2601.18696v4 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Hardware trojans are malicious circuits which compromise the functionality and security of an integrated circuit (IC). These circuits are manufactured directly into the silicon and cannot be fixed by security patches like software. The solution would require a costly product recall by replacing the IC and hence, early detection in the design process is essential. Hardware detection at best provides statistically based solutions with many false positives and false negatives. These detection methods require more thorough explainable analysis to
The increasing complexity and supply chain interdependencies of integrated circuits, coupled with escalating geopolitical tensions, amplify the risk and impact of hardware Trojans, necessitating advanced detection methods.
Sophisticated hardware Trojan detection is critical for national security, economic stability, and the trustworthiness of critical infrastructure, as these malicious circuits pose an undetectable and unpatchable threat at the foundational level.
The focus on explainability methods shifts the paradigm from simple detection to understanding the 'why' behind a potential Trojan, reducing false positives/negatives and enabling more reliable hardware security.
- · semiconductor manufacturers
- · national security agencies
- · supply chain security providers
- · AI/ML explainability researchers
- · malicious state actors
- · unsecured supply chain vendors
- · companies reliant on untrustworthy hardware
- · traditional hardware verification methods
Improved detection leads to more secure hardware components, mitigating risks in critical systems.
The cost of embedding and detecting hardware Trojans increases significantly, deterring some actors.
Trust in the global semiconductor supply chain is partially restored, but a two-tiered system for trusted/untrusted hardware emerges.
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