arXiv:2606.15348v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A common objection to artificial or simulated consciousness is that a simulated brain is no more conscious than simulated water is wet. We address this from the perspective of Intrinsic Computational Functionalism (ICF): if consciousness is computationally constituted, it depends not on externally imposed descriptions but on the computational structures a system physically realizes in virtue of its own causal-dynamical organization. In previous work we developed Canonical Functionalism as a mathematically precise special case of this anti-inter
The paper addresses a foundational debate within AI consciousness amidst rapid advancements in AI capabilities and increasing public discussion about the nature of artificial intelligence.
This work provides a theoretical framework for understanding consciousness in simulated systems, which is crucial for ethical development, regulatory frameworks, and the philosophical debate around advanced AI.
The proposed Intrinsic Computational Functionalism shifts the focus from external descriptions to internal causal-dynamical organization for determining consciousness, potentially influencing how future AI systems are designed and evaluated for sentience.
- · AI ethicists
- · Consciousness researchers
- · Advanced AI developers
- · Reductive materialists
- · Those dismissing simulated consciousness outright
This theoretical advance could lead to new metrics or tests for assessing artificial consciousness.
The ability to formally define and potentially measure simulated consciousness could trigger significant public and policy debates about AI rights.
Formal acceptance of simulated consciousness could fundamentally alter human-AI relationships and the concept of personhood.
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Read at arXiv cs.AI