arXiv:2606.22504v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Coding agents often receive broad tool access for an entire task, even when a resource is needed only for one subgoal. We call this gap lingering authority: a temporary resource/effect capability remains exposed after the episode that justified it has closed. PORTICO is a reference monitor for revocable capabilities exposed to the planner. It compiles an explicit task contract into initial capabilities, grant rules, trusted closure predicates, and global deny rules. A request-grant-invoke lifecycle materializes expansions as opaque, epoch-bound
The proliferation of advanced AI agents necessitates robust security and control mechanisms to prevent unintended actions and maintain system integrity, a problem becoming more acute with increased agent autonomy.
This development addresses a critical vulnerability in agentic AI systems, enhancing their safety, reliability, and deployability in sensitive applications by enforcing precise resource access control.
The ability to grant and revoke specific capabilities to coding agents on demand significantly refines how AI systems interact with resources, moving beyond broad, persistent access.
- · AI platform developers
- · Enterprise IT security
- · Cloud service providers
- · Industries deploying AI agents
- · Malicious actors exploiting AI agent vulnerabilities
- · Companies with lax AI security models
AI agents become more reliable and trustworthy for complex, security-sensitive tasks.
Increased adoption of AI agents in critical infrastructure and highly regulated industries due to enhanced control and auditability.
New regulatory frameworks for AI agent deployment emerge, mandating granular control and revocable capabilities as standard practice.
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Read at arXiv cs.AI