MIDS: Detecting Stealthy Masquerade and Tampering Attacks on CAN Bus via Bidirectional Mamba
arXiv:2606.18599v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The Controller Area Network (CAN) protocol is the primary communication standard for Electronic Control Units (ECUs) in modern vehicles, but its lack of encryption and authentication exposes it to a range of security threats. Existing intrusion detection systems are largely tuned to fabrication-style attacks (DoS, fuzzing, ID spoofing realised by frame injection), in which detection signals such as per-ID inter-arrival statistics are readily available. We instead address the harder \emph{masquerade} setting~\cite{b37}, in which an internal adve
The increasing sophistication of cyber threats and the growing complexity of automotive systems necessitate more advanced intrusion detection methods, especially as vehicles become more connected and autonomous.
Securing in-vehicle networks is critical for passenger safety, data integrity, and preventing widespread disruption in modern transportation infrastructure.
Traditional intrusion detection systems focused on fabrication attacks will be augmented or replaced by more subtle techniques capable of detecting stealthy masquerade and tampering, increasing the security posture of intelligent vehicles.
- · Automotive cybersecurity companies
- · Vehicle manufacturers implementing advanced security
- · Consumers of smart vehicles
- · Cybercriminals targeting automotive systems
- · Manufacturers with outdated cybersecurity strategies
Immediate adoption of more robust CAN bus security protocols may follow in new vehicle designs.
Increased R&D investment in AI-driven cybersecurity solutions for embedded systems across various industries.
The development of a competitive advantage for vehicle brands known for their superior cybersecurity safeguards, driving market share.
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Read at arXiv cs.AI