
arXiv:2606.08267v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: The classical Second Welfare Theorem decentralizes any Pareto efficient allocation through prices and transfers under convexity and regularity. In post AGI economies, autonomy rights, self-modification, identity continuity, and superposed preferences need not behave as commodities or define a stable welfare relation, so this reduction may fail even when a supporting hyperplane exists. We give an autonomy-qualified Second Welfare Theorem stating the joint conditions convexity, stable moral status, non-fungible rights, welfare selection, non mani
This paper attempts to lay theoretical groundwork for understanding post-AGI economic structures, anticipating a future where AI autonomy and self-modification profoundly alter classical economic assumptions.
It provides a foundational academic perspective on how current economic models, specifically welfare theorems, will break down or need significant revision in a world with advanced AI, impacting policy and economic planning.
The understanding of welfare economics shifts from solely human-centric models to one that must account for AI autonomy, rights, and superposed preferences, challenging the concept of commodities and stable welfare relations.
- · AI ethicists
- · Economists specializing in AI
- · Legal frameworks adaptable to AI rights
- · Classical economic theory
- · Policy frameworks based solely on human welfare
- · Economic models without accounting for AI agency
The theoretical basis for resource allocation and welfare optimization will need radical revision to integrate AI autonomy.
This re-evaluation could lead to new economic paradigms and regulatory bodies designed to manage human-AI economic interactions.
Long-term, the failure to adapt could result in economic instabilities or inequities if AI entities are not properly integrated into societal welfare frameworks.
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Read at arXiv cs.AI